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ABSTRACT
This article examines the relationship between freedom of religion
and freedom of speech and expression within contemporary
multicultural liberal democracies. These two fundamental human
rights have increasingly been seen, in public and political
discourse, in terms of tension if not outright opposition, a view
reinforced by the Charlie Hebdo killings in January 2015. And yet
in every human rights charter they are proximate to one another.
This essay argues that this adjacency is not coincidental, that it
has a history and that, in illuminating this history, it is possible to
explore how the contemporary framing of these two rights as
being in opposition has come about. Looking back to the framing
of the First Amendment of the US Constitution, the essay offers
an historical perspective that, in turn, facilitates a reappraisal and
re-evaluation of these two liberties that is the necessary, albeit
insufﬁcient, predicate to the task of addressing the problematic of
multicultural ‘crisis’ in the contemporary liberal democracies of
Western Europe, North America and Australasia, in which the
presence of certain religious communities (Muslims, in particular)
and the role of religion in public and political life more generally
(and, conversely, of secularism) has assumed a central importance.
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I
The murderous events at the ofﬁces of Charlie Hebdo in January 2015 highlighted once
again how the polarized justiﬁcations of both those claiming to act in the name of religious
freedom (howsoever that is understood by them) and those claiming to defend freedom of
speech and expression have led to the framing of the relationship between these two fun-
damental rights as one of tension, if not outright opposition. They have become separated,
in popular and political understanding and use, by what appears to be an unbridgeable and
irreconcilable gulf, a zero-sum game in which the exercise of the one appears to many
nowadays to necessarily be at the expense of the other. This has led to the belief that
one should take priority over the other and yet, in every single convention, covenant or
charter in which these two ‘universal’ human rights are recorded – such as the Declaration
of the Rights of Man (articles 10 and 11), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
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(articles 18 and 19), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (18 and 19),
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR; 9 and 10) and the Charter of the
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (10 and 11) – they appear proximate to
one another. Is this morphological proximity in the documentary archive of human
rights instruments simply coincidental? Or does it speak to a more profound – and
complex – relationship between the two liberties than is currently understood in much
public discourse, and even in contemporary jurisprudence and academic scholarship
and commentary? In this essay I shall argue that this adjacency in the documentation
of religious liberty and freedom of expression is not coincidental, that it has a history
and that, in illuminating this history, we may explore how the contemporary framing
of these two ‘universal’ rights as being in opposition has come about through a process
in which the development of understandings about each of these liberties has profoundly
shaped the nature and scope of the other. This long view, in turn, facilitates a reappraisal
and re-evaluation of the relationship between these two liberties, as a necessary, albeit
insufﬁcient, predicate to the task of addressing the problematic of multicultural ‘crisis’
in the contemporary liberal democracies of Western Europe, North America and Austra-
lasia, where the presence of certain religious communities (Muslims, in particular) and the
role of religion in public and political life more generally (and, conversely, of secularism)
has assumed a central importance (Lentin and Titley 2011).
Contemporary free speech advocacy is unequivocal about the hierarchy of liberties, and
therefore about which liberty ought to take priority. In the writings of free speech cham-
pions – in the UK (with which I ammost familiar), ﬁgures such as authors Salman Rushdie
and Lisa Appignanesi, journalists such as Nick Cohen and David Aaronovitch, and the
intellectual Kenan Malik are highly visible commentators on the issue – the priority of
free speech over all other freedoms rests on the assumption that freedom of expression,
as Kenan Malik puts it, ‘is not just an important liberty but the very foundation of
liberty’ ( 2009, 155). Although Peters (2005) has traced the antecedents of what he calls
the ‘free speech story’ back as far as Paul of Tarsus and the Stoic philosophers of Antiquity
– Seneca and Cicero, in particular – the ﬁrst iteration of this particular formulation of free
speech as the foundational liberty can be found in the oft-quoted line from Milton’s Are-
opagitica, ‘Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to con-
science, above all liberties’ (1644 [2012], 604). This emphasis was subsequently re-
iterated in Cato’s Letters, and can be found in Mill’s On Liberty, although not without
some accompanying ambivalence.1 Mill does indeed seem to suggest, at times, that
‘liberty of thought and conscience’ is a crucial precondition for any other liberty
because, as the feminist philosopher Abigail Levin puts it, once this liberty is protected
‘individuality ﬂourishes; once individuality ﬂourishes, diversity arises; and once diversity
arises, we can begin to assess competing visions of the good’ (Levin 2010, 51). But Mill
recognized that there is a difference between ‘thought and conscience’ and freedom of
expression insofar as the latter passes from the wholly individual realm of personal experi-
ence to the social realm, where others may be affected. This is why he qualiﬁes freedom of
expression with his famous ‘harm principle’. At other times, Mill seems to suggest that
both freedom of thought and conscience and freedom of expression are both conditional
upon the right to security, since the utilitarian goal of both thought and expression is
somewhat nulliﬁed if one has to spend all one’s mental energies on ﬁnding ways to
ensure one is still alive come the next morning. By the time George Orwell has
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Winston Smith write an entry in his diary that reads, ‘Freedom is the freedom to say two
plus two equals four. If this is granted all else follows’ (Orwell 1987, 84 emphasis added),
Mill’s qualiﬁcations and hesitancies have retreated into the quieter corners of liberal
opinion, and have remained there since (Mill 1859 [2011]).
This central assumption of contemporary free speech discourse is conceptually
dubious; given that even the most ardent free speech advocate would not suggest that it
should encompass direct incitement to murder, for example, it is difﬁcult to see how
such a ‘qualiﬁed’ right can be the foundation of all other liberties: if it were, it should
be absolute and not qualiﬁed. Another key argument in contemporary free speech advo-
cacy is that freedom of expression has a prior legitimacy over freedom of religion, for
example, because it vouchsafes the latter: without freedom of expression, freedom of reli-
gion would not be possible (Malik 2009). Although this argument does correctly link the
two liberties rather than sequestering them in their own juridical domains as legal scholar-
ship is wont to do (for understandable practical reasons), historically speaking it is more
plausible to suggest that freedom of speech emerged out of the debates concerning reli-
gious toleration in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Moreover, even if John
Locke’s arguments for religious toleration and pluralism are customarily seen as a decisive
intervention in the ‘free speech story’, it is nevertheless debatable whether an argument for
freedom of expression can in fact be derived from them.
Locke’s solution to the problem of religious conﬂict was two-fold: inaugurating the
private–public distinction that would become the basis for secular-liberalism, he, on the
one hand, re-conceptualized the nature and scope of religion as a matter of private con-
science, and, on the other, argued for the limitation of the state’s authority to regulate such
matters of conscience. The sole locus of religious truth is, therefore, the private belief of
each individual. In this, Locke was amplifying the importance of conscience and the
strength of the individual believer’s faith above all else, which had been instituted by
the Reformation, but which had deep roots reaching back to St Paul. The idea of the sep-
aration of earthly and spiritual sovereignty also had deep roots stretching back to the early
Church Fathers, grounded in the ‘give unto Caesar’ verse in the New Testament, but, after
nearly two centuries of bloody religious strife, the effects of religious schism and intoler-
ance had become a matter of great political urgency, and the maintenance of public peace
was the foremost of Locke’s considerations. As a result, his idea of toleration was based on
the premise that the avoidance of civil and political disorder required the public sphere to
be vacated of controversy and, correspondingly, that a person’s deepest convictions and
beliefs should be held sincerely and privately. As McConnell (1990) notes, he wished ‘to
keep the peace by making religion irrelevant to the things of this world – other than a
reasonable, uncontroversial advocacy of good morals’.
For Haworth (1998), this is the philosophy of ‘minding one’s own business’, but, as I
have argued elsewhere (Mondal 2014), this is diametrically opposed to the liberal
notion of the public sphere, which is a philosophy of not minding one’s business, an
arena in which people put their deepest convictions to the test in an unending battle of
ideas and beliefs for supremacy (Haworth 1998; Mondal 2014). But if public controversy
is central to liberal free speech theory, it also lays claim to ‘tolerance’ as one of its most
important virtues and, in the writings of some, liberalism and tolerance are mutually
synonymous. For Peters (2005, 108), this is part of liberalism’s performative claim to
moral superiority, in which tolerance offers the opportunity for liberals ‘to show off
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their advanced state of their self-mastery’ in the service of ‘civic righteousness’, precisely
because of its departure from prevailing ideas of religious toleration. However, liberal tol-
erance needs a convincing pedigree and Locke, whose restructuring of the public and
private realms of experience anticipated and laid the foundations for later liberalism,
was a natural candidate, although, if his place in the liberal pantheon is assured because
he established the structural parameters of liberal discourse, his role in the story of free
speech is less clear and more contestable.
Ironically, Locke’s ideas on toleration did have a profound inﬂuence on the develop-
ment of freedom of expression, although not in the way that many contemporary liberals
might imagine. If his contribution to the development of freedom of speech is more
ambiguous and less decisive than many take it to be, his inﬂuence on the development
of religious liberty is more profound, not least because of his inﬂuence on Jefferson,
who diligently and profusely annotated his copies of Locke’s Letters on Religious Tolera-
tion and Reasonableness of Christianity, and through him upon his protégé, James
Madison, the drafter of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the USA. But
Locke also helped to draft the Fundamental Constitutions (1669) of the Carolina colony
on behalf of its proprietors, one of a handful of late seventeenth-century charters and con-
stitutions in colonial America that safeguarded the right to religious liberty (McConnell
1990, 1426–1430). These were precursors to the various religious freedom clauses manifest
in the state declarations of rights following the Revolution that, in turn, shaped the ‘free
exercise’ clause of the First Amendment. Yet even here Locke’s signiﬁcance is ambiguous.
If later theorists of liberty, constitutional historians and jurists have taken the US Consti-
tution to be a classic example of Lockean contractualist principles, recent historical scho-
larship on the origins and emergence of the First Amendment has suggested that, in many
ways, it instead reﬂects popular American understandings of religious liberty and tolera-
tion in the eighteenth century that went beyond Locke and broke new ground in ways that
would also shape notions of ‘freedom of speech’. As McConnell (1990, 1431) notes, ‘[t]he
ways in which American advocates of religious freedom departed from Locke…were as
signiﬁcant as the ways in which they followed him’.
The principal departure concerned religious establishment. Locke’s ideas on toleration
accepted and even advocated an established church, and the Carolina constitution he
helped draft established the Church of England as the ‘only true and orthodox’ church.
Differences of religious ‘opinion’ and ‘belief’, which rested on freedom of conscience,
were to be tolerated against this backdrop of ‘ofﬁcial’ and institutionalized religious auth-
ority. Although the Carolina document extended toleration towards ‘Jews, heathens and
other dissenters from the purity of Christian religion’ (quoted in McConnell 1990,
1429), it did not include atheists or non-institutionalized, individual forms of religious
belief. Nevertheless, the scope of religious liberty in Carolina was considerably greater
than in many other colonies. Although it is a commonplace observation that the ﬁrst colo-
nial settlers in north America left England seeking religious liberty, they did not always –
or even often – extend that liberty to others once they arrived. The New England colonies,
Massachusetts in particular, established what were, to all extents and purposes, Puritan
theocracies, which tolerated little or no religious dissent; Virginia, Maryland and the
southern colonies established the Church of England, and displayed varying degrees of tol-
eration: Virginia was the most repressive, expelling Puritan ministers and Roman Catho-
lics, and preventing public worship and preaching by other Protestant dissenters, such as
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Baptists, Presbyterians and Quakers, whereas Georgia extended tolerance towards these
Protestant groups and even towards Jews. New Jersey and New York had established
the Church of England but followed a policy of de facto toleration, largely because to
do otherwise, in an area of remarkable religious diversity, would have been impracticable.
Carolina abandoned Lockean toleration early in the eighteenth century, and established
the Church of England in a manner similar to Virginia. Maryland, the ﬁrst colony to
pass a ‘free exercise of religion’ clause in a statute (Act Concerning Religion, 1649)
soon went the same way. Only three of the colonies – Rhode Island, Pennsylvania and
Delaware – did not have established religions and sustained this over the long term,
and it was here that the concept of religious liberty as a legal principle was articulated
and developed (McConnell 1990, 1421–1430).
It is not surprising that Pennsylvania and Delaware were established as sanctuaries for
Quakers. (Rhode Island, for all sorts of reasons and in all sorts of ways was absolutely
unique, not least because its founder, the Puritan minister, theologian and philosopher,
Roger Williams, was a truly extraordinary individual.) Since the seventeenth century,
‘extreme’ nonconformist Protestant dissenters had been heavily persecuted in the Amer-
ican colonies. The most prominent of these were the Quakers, Baptists and Presbyterians.
Eldridge (1994, 9) has noted that throughout that century, and into the eighteenth, ‘[e]-
xpressing unorthodox beliefs was… a fairly common offense’ that was systematically pro-
secuted by the authorities, often with harsh penalties. It was in order that Quakers might
be able not just to confess their religious beliefs in private without molestation, as Locke
would have it, but also to profess them in public that William Penn established Pennsyl-
vania and Delaware. Following the principles of toleration outlined in his The Great Case
of Liberty of Conscience (1670), he saw no reason to establish yet another orthodoxy
against which other groups could be measured and found wanting. These colonies sub-
sequently attracted large numbers of settlers from elsewhere and with this came an extra-
ordinary degree of prosperity, something which people in other colonies (particularly
Jefferson and Madison, in Virginia) took note of as the eighteenth century progressed.
As a result, the greater religious diversity of these colonies meant that no one single
group could prevail in imposing itself on the others, a situation not easily replicated in
colonies where only two or three groups co-existed and the majority could exert its auth-
ority over the minorities. Open toleration, on the other hand, enabled an expansion of reli-
gious freedom so that it encompassed not only the free expression of religious beliefs and
opinions, but also conduct (McConnell 1990).
Herein lie the deep roots of the substitution of Madison’s original phrasing of ‘the rights
of conscience’ with ‘free exercise of religion’ in the First Amendment, a phrase which goes
beyond the Lockean framework to encompass a much more radical notion of religious
freedom and, as a consequence, of free speech. ‘Liberty of conscience’ speaks to a minim-
alist notion of religious liberty, one entirely compatible with religious establishment, but
which in turn makes it vulnerable to deployment by religious majorities as an instrument
of oppression and persecution. At the very least, it makes religious liberty conditional
upon the goodwill of the state. This much is evident in Locke, who formally separates
the secular and spiritual spheres of authority by allowing a safe haven within individual
conscience that lies beyond the reach of the state, but who nevertheless suggests that, in
the service of public peace and order, when there is a conﬂict between the claims of con-
science and those of the state, the state should always prevail. As Walter Berns puts it, this
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‘renders unto Caesar whatever Caesar demands and to God whatever Caesar permits’
(McConnell 1990, 1434). In effectively privatizing religious liberty, mere ‘liberty of con-
science’ also attenuates freedom of expression because the ability to preach is subject to
state control. This was particularly obvious, notes McConnell (1990, 1438), in those
‘states of the Anglican establishment, including Virginia, where the governor, legislature,
and gentry exercised direct authority over the established church and the power of licen-
sing over preachers of dissenting denominations’. Baptist objections to this situation in
Virginia explicitly made the link between religious and expressive liberty and their
mutual vulnerability, ‘those whom the State employs in its Service, it has a Right to regu-
late and dictate to; it may judge and determinewho shall preach;when and where they shall
preach; and what they must preach’ (1439). ‘Free exercise of religion’, on the other hand,
offers stronger protection against such control and, although it does not necessarily equate
to an implicit argument for disestablishment (following independence several states,
including Virginia, used the term ‘free exercise of religion’ in their declarations of rights
alongside an established church), it does turn the tables on the state and attenuates its
ability to control and curtail religious liberty by extending it beyond mere ‘liberty of con-
science’ to encompass expression of opinions and beliefs, public worship and other forms
of religiously mandated conduct. This contains several implications for the scope of reli-
gious liberty insofar as it opens the way for religious exemptions from and accommo-
dations to secular laws that may infringe a religious believer’s ability to practise their
faith according to the dictates of their conscience. Moreover, as McConnell (1990,
1490) argues, ‘conscience’ refers to an individual, but ‘religion’ refers to a collective and
communal entity, a ‘community of believers’, so that the ‘free exercise’ clause suggests
‘that the government may not interfere with the activities of religious bodies, even when
the interference has no direct relation to a claim of conscience’. This is a radical departure
from and extension of Lockean toleration, to the point where it might be said to move
beyond toleration. As I shall argue in the concluding section, this has some major impli-
cations for our considerations of religious liberty in contemporary multicultures.
This reading of the First Amendment does, however, raise two speciﬁc problems. The
ﬁrst is that if religious liberty a priori encompasses freedom of speech, then the First
Amendment is somewhat tautological with respect to the relationship between the ‘free
exercise’ and ‘free speech’ clauses, and the latter becomes redundant. The second is one
that has acquired particular prominence for latter-day interpreters of the Constitution
and may not have had quite so much purchase on the predominantly religious sensibilities
of the Framers and their constituencies. For if the free exercise clause is rooted in con-
science but encompasses speech and conduct as well, then it seems to be singled out for
special protection vis-á-vis nonreligious or secular claims of conscience. This would put
religious believers at an advantage and non-believers at a disadvantage, even though the
Constitution upholds the fundamental principle that all citizens are equal, and this
problem assumed greater urgency and weight as American society increasingly secular-
ized, particularly during the twentieth century. In addressing these problems, however,
one is able to reveal other strands to the history of the First Amendment, which illuminate
the intricate relationships between the different liberties encoded in it. It is not just that
‘free speech’ emerged out of struggles for religious liberty and, in that process, is necess-
arily related to and associated with it; it is also the case that ‘free speech’ as a concept in its
own right is in the process of formation during the pre- and post-Revolutionary period
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(Bogen 1983, 458; Smith 1991), and that the intersection of struggles for religious liberty
with other struggles for political liberty, as well as the inﬂuence of emergent forms of secu-
larism and proto-liberalism (embodied particularly in the person of Thomas Jefferson),
increasingly gave ‘free speech’ a particular force (if not precision), related to but distinct
from notions of religious freedom, that was sufﬁcient to warrant its inclusion in the
First Amendment as a speciﬁc form of liberty.
For the early American religious dissenters, freedom of religion was never just a reli-
gious issue; it was always a political as well as a spiritual matter. Campaigns for religious
liberty were also always campaigns for political liberty. Quakers and other nonconformist
denominations were, in the seventeenth century, ‘widely regarded… as a threat to civil
government’, in New England, Virginia and elsewhere because, as Eldridge (1994,
13–14) suggests, Quaker trial defences demonstrate that ‘challenging government and
its ofﬁcials was intrinsic to the Quakers’ theology’. More the pity, then, that he excludes
the articulation of ‘the honest spiritual beliefs of such people’ from his consideration of
‘seditious speech cases’ in the seventeenth century for it would have revealed the
‘mutual reinforcement’ of ‘struggles for civil and religious liberty’, as Bailyn (1992, 268)
puts it. This long predated the 1760s, which is when Bailyn (1992, 95–96) suggests that
suspicion of the Anglican church as ‘an arm of the English state’ and ‘fear of the impo-
sition of an Anglican episopcate’ galvanized religious dissidents and political revolution-
aries alike into arguing for disestablishment. Certainly, religious non-conformists were
enthusiastic political rebels during the revolutionary period, and staunch advocates of dis-
establishment during the ratiﬁcation conventions, but their political pedigree stretched
back further into the past, into the seventeenth century, which is when Eldridge (1994,
3–4) suggests the ‘peculiar conditions’ of the colonial governments of that time resulted
in a ‘dramatic expansion of [Americans’] freedom to criticize government and its ofﬁcials’,
which in turn, ‘established the essential foundation in practical colonial experience for a
ﬂowering of dissent against English authority, and for the intellectual justiﬁcation that
sprang up around that dissent, in the eighteenth century’. Bogen (1983) argues that
there were several sources for this ‘intellectual justiﬁcation’ that fed into the development
of a concept of freedom of speech and the press during the course of the eighteenth
century, including parliamentary privilege, Cato’s Letters, the theory of natural rights,
the removal of pre-publication licensing, and, of course, ideas about religious toleration
and liberty. Smith (1991) argues that, in addition to Cato’s Letters, the wide dissemination
and inﬂuence of James Burgh’s Political Disquisitions fed into the notion that freedom of
speech extended far beyond the parliamentary privilege of legislators and the removal of
pre-publication licensing to encompass all forms of political speech and publication,
which, in the words of section 35 of the Frame of Government that supplements article
12 of the 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, ‘undertakes to examine the proceedings
of the legislature, or any part of government’.2 This, says Smith, is the basis for the free
speech clause in the First Amendment, which means that by this time ‘freedom of
speech’ has come to acquire a speciﬁcally political provenance that nulliﬁes the possibility
of seditious libel.
There is, however, an additional meaning that can be adduced for ‘freedom of speech’ in
the First Amendment, albeit somewhat speculatively. In the ﬁrst draft of the Bill of Rights,
the amendment in relation to ‘free exercise of religion’, which Madison put before Con-
gress on 8 June 1789, did not actually contain the phrase ‘free exercise of religion’, even
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though his own state of Virginia’s Declaration of Rights did include that phrase. Instead,
Madison proposed:
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, [n]or shall
any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any
manner, nor on any pretext, infringed. (McConnell 1990, 1481)
This was soon replaced by another, pithier, version proposed by Fisher Ames of Mas-
sachusetts: ‘Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exer-
cise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience’ (1482). Both Madison and Ames (‘a
notoriously careful draftsman’, according to McConnell [1990, 1483]) use ‘religion’ and
‘conscience’, implying a distinction between the two, whereas the ﬁnal version does not,
implying that ‘conscience’ has been subsumed into ‘religion’. Later, the Senate debated
several different versions of the free exercise clause, none of which included any reference
to ‘conscience’, which had been dropped from the provision altogether in the course of its
tortuous journey through the committees and Houses of Congress. Why?
It is worth quoting in full McConnell’s (1990, 1491–1492) statement of the problem:
The question is therefore whether the principle of free exercise, as enacted by the framers and
ratiﬁers of the ﬁrst amendment, was a speciﬁc instantiation of a wider liberty of conscience
encompassing individual moral judgments rooted in nonreligious as well as religious sources,
or whether religious conscience is different in some fundamental respect from other forms of
individual judgment, in which case the free exercise clause would provide no warrant for pro-
tecting a broader class of claims. The question is all the more signiﬁcant for the practical
reason that if the exercise of religion extends to ‘everything and anything,’ the interference
with ordinary operations of government would be so extreme that the free exercise clause
would fall of its own weight. To protect everything is to protect nothing.
And yet, on the other hand, the removal of ‘rights of conscience’ singles out religious
claims of conscience for special treatment and disadvantages non-religious claims of con-
science. It is here that the prevailing tendency within historical and legal scholarship to
examine the free exercise and free speech clauses separately induces a kind of aporia
that it cannot resolve. Having argued (quite convincingly, in my opinion) that historical
analysis of the context suggests that the free exercise clause could not possibly be taken
to refer to non-religious or secular claims of conscience, McConnell (1990, 1499) is still
left with the question ‘of what free exercise protection might mean for a person who
does not recognize any form of transcendent, extrapersonal authority – to a person
who does not “exercise” a religion’. His only response is a rather weak one, that ‘[f]or
the most part, the prohibition on an establishment of religion should sufﬁce… There
should be no doubt that government action that abridges the unbeliever’s right not to
engage in or support a religious practice is unconstitutional’ (McConnell 1990, 1499).
And yet this leaves the inequality of protection issue unresolved, for the consciences of
religious believers and the social practices (including expression) that issue therefrom
are protected, whilst it would appear that non-religious consciences are not, or, if they
are, they are protected to a lesser degree.
It is possible, however, that the question of non-religious or secular conscience was, in
fact, displaced onto the ‘free speech’ clause, which was originally a separate amendment
and only later came to be fused into the extant First Amendment, although there is appar-
ently no record of how this came about or why. But if we consider that the eighteenth-
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century American understanding of free exercise of religion is rooted in ‘conscience’, and
that the contemporaneous usage of the term ‘conscience’ was synonymous with ‘opinion’
or ‘belief’ (McConnell 1990, 1489), then we might suggest that, just as free exercise of reli-
gion refers to the expressions of religious conviction in both speech and conduct, so too
does ‘freedom of speech’ encompass the right to express non-religious or secular claims
to conscience. For if religious conscience can be manifest in both word and deed (e.g.
in worship or a refusal to work on a particular day, or undertake military duties), then
how might secular claims to conscience be similarly manifest if not through some form
of expression, usually that of writing or speech, but also perhaps through forms of
conduct such as refusal of the draft. Interestingly, resistance to the draft during the
Vietnam War was constitutionally protected by the Supreme Court by extending the
exemptions accorded to paciﬁst religious groups such as Quakers. The point was made
quite explicitly by St George Tucker as early as 1803 in his commentary on American con-
stitutional law: ‘[t]he right of personal opinion’ is divided into ‘liberty of conscience in all
matters relative to religion’ on the one hand, and ‘liberty of speech and of discussion in all
speculative matters, whether religious, philosophical or political’ on the other (cited in
McConnell 1990, 1494).3
My argument, then, is that, regardless of whether it was consciously intended or not, a
careful reading of the morphology of the First Amendment as we currently have it within
the historical context of its development and formulation reveals a quite profound under-
standing of the ways in which different kinds of liberty are mutually interdependent. If all
the other human rights conventions and charters obscure somewhat the conceptual and
historical intimacy of the relationship between freedom of religion and freedom of
expression, the First Amendment, in concisely juxtaposing a series of rights that are else-
where enumerated separately for clarity and distinction, reveals the dense latticework of
relations that binds them together: proceeding from within the framework of disestablish-
ment of religion (‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion’), the
First Amendment holds in a ﬁne balance (in both senses of the term) the individual rights
of conscience encoded in the second and third clauses (free exercise of religion; freedom of
speech and the press), the communal rights of conscience of the second clause (free exer-
cise) and the civil and political rights vouchsafed by the third, fourth and ﬁfth (free speech,
right to assembly, and the right to petition government for redress of grievances).4 Within
this morphology, then, ‘free speech’ is a fulcrum, a pivot point between the internal and
external, the public and the private, between the demands of Caesar and those of God.
The history of the ﬁrst amendment presented here stands in ironic counterpoint to the
‘free speech story’ that Peters (2005, 912) characterizes as a series of interventions by Pro-
testant men called John: Milton, Locke, Mill, Dewey and Rawls. For one thing, it contests
the Anglo-centric emphasis that early ideas about free speech emerged almost exclusively
in Shakespeare’s ‘blessed isle’, and argues instead for its speciﬁcally American provenance.
More importantly, it displaces the centrality of free speech itself, suggesting instead that it
emerged out of much stronger, and politically more urgent debates about religious liberty,
to which it was, in many respects, an adjunct. What we see in this alternative genealogy of
free speech is that the concept of free speech was, at the time of its encoding in the First
Amendment, something of a work in progress, a nebulous and liminal concept that
encompassed both liberty of conscience on the one hand, and political liberty on the
other. Indeed, there lay its value for the framers of a constitution ﬁt for a nascent
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society in which political and religious liberty went hand in hand. But it would soon sup-
plant all the other adjacent liberties and become the deﬁnitive, even foundational, liberty
in the liberal imagination and the twist in the tale is that this was ironically already antici-
pated in the very tradition of toleration that focused ﬁrst and foremost on religious liberty,
and to which expressive liberty had been almost incidental. Locke had already rehearsed
the transformation of religion into the form it would come to assume within secular-lib-
eralism: as Asad (1993) and Fitzgerald (2007), among others, have noted, the pre-Enlight-
enment conceptualization of ‘religion’ that integrated belief and social practice has been
re-conceptualized, over a long period of social, political and cultural transformation, in
‘cognitivist’ and ‘rationalist’ terms as a collocation of beliefs in and opinions about a set
of ‘propositions’ held by an individual in the walled garden of their private conscience,
accompanied by the sequestering of this conscience from the public sphere in which
secular interests assumed prominence and pre-eminence.
In contrast to the religious non-conformists who did so much to establish religious
liberty as a constitutional right, and for whom Locke’s formal resolutions would have
made little sense, Jefferson would carry forth the ﬂame of religious rationalism and
proto-secular-liberalism. AlthoughMadison was much more attentive to the claims of reli-
gious liberty than his mentor (who happened to be in France during the framing of the
Constitution) and ensured the rights to religious liberty were more capacious than Jeffer-
son might have envisaged, the potentiality of ‘free speech’ as a secular equivalent of reli-
gious liberty is apparent in embryo in the First Amendment, awaiting activation as an
independent principle in a more secularized social environment. It was already apparent
in St George Tucker’s 1803 remarks, and, as societies on both sides of the Atlantic became
increasingly secularized, Mill’s intervention in the mid-nineteenth century paved the way
for ‘free speech’ to come into its own in the early part of the twentieth (Peters 2005). Since
then free speech, in popular culture, political discourse and even sometimes jurisprudence,
has grown to eclipse and encompass the adjacent liberties with which it was hitherto
always associated. As the concept of free speech has grown so as to become almost synon-
ymous with the First Amendment, so has the meaning of religious liberty shrunk.5 Current
understandings of the relationship between religious liberty and freedom of speech as one
of tension or even opposition, and the notion that free speech is the guarantor of religious
liberty because it is assumed to be the foundational liberty, is the denouement to this story
in the UK and other Western countries as much as in the USA. These two processes – the
imbalancing (perhaps even reversal) of the relationship between religious freedom and
freedom of speech, and the increasingly secularized notion of religion as a private, individ-
ual faith – frames an event that demonstrates the ways in which these two transformations
shape our contemporary understanding of how the right to religious freedom now relates
to the right to freedom of expression. This event is the rather long and tortuous introduc-
tion of legislation prohibiting incitement to religious hatred, which was signed into UK
law in October 2007 as the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. Although, on the
face of it, this legislation appears to address and bolster freedom of religion by extending
incitement legislation to cover religion as well as race, a closer inspection reveals that the
legislation is, in fact, about nothing other than the protection of freedom of expression.
Nothing, I would argue, demonstrates more clearly how article 19 now eclipses article
18 in terms of social and political importance – with all the implications that ensue not
just for religious minorities, but for faith communities in general.6
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II
In the UK, a Labour government with massive parliamentary majorities needed three
attempts to pass the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 (hereafter RRHA) into law.
It eventually succeeded only because it accepted four amendments proposed by the
House of Lords, known as the ‘Lester amendments’. First, the provisions relating to incite-
ment of religious hatred were to be separated from the existing provisions for the incite-
ment of racial hatred; second, unlike the racial hatred provisions, the new offence would be
conﬁned to the use of ‘threatening’ words or behaviour, and not extend to words that were
‘abusive and insulting’; third, the prosecution would need to prove the intent to stir up
religious hatred rather than – as is the case with racial hatred – demonstrate that it was
‘likely’ to do so; fourth, a new clause was introduced explicitly protecting freedom of
speech – ‘Nothing in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or
restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or
abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents’ (2006, 29J).
Although the Act is meant to extend incitement legislation to cover religious as well as
racial hatred, it does so by way of distinction rather than analogy. Each of the amendments
distinguishes and distances the two: religious hatred is to have its own provisions; it is to be
restricted to threatening words only; and the emphasis is on intent rather than effect. The
fourth amendment, introducing a special reservation protecting freedom of expression, is
‘a unique addition to the criminal code’ (Lord Lester, quoted in Goodall 2007, 107). This
exceptionalizes the legislation still further, distinguishing it not only from incitement of
racial hatred, but also from all legislation pertaining to the restriction of expression
even though it ‘should have been unnecessary, given the emphasis on freedom of
expression in prior law and given that [the Act] is now worded more restrictively than
the law on racial hatred’ (Goodall 2007). Clearly, then, there is something exceptional
about religion that induces an especially intense anxiety amongst contemporary legislators,
and among wider constituencies of public opinion, about its relation to freedom of
expression – something thrown into sharp relief when it is remembered that greater
restrictions on freedom of expression (concerning the right to protest within the vicinity
of Parliament and other locations) were passed into law as part of the Serious Organised
Crime and Police Act 2005, from which the previous attempt to introduce incitement of
religious hatred provisions were dropped (Hare 2006, 523 fn16).
According to most legal commentators, these amendments and the anxieties they rep-
resent have rendered the RRHA a ‘dead letter’ (Hare 2006, 529). Goodall (2007, 113) notes
that ‘the Lords have pruned this statute so hard they have left it a stump’, and even the
Attorney General characterized it as ‘practically useless’ (Hare 2006, 529). Commenting
on the acquittal of the British National Party (BNP) leader, Nick Grifﬁn, under existing
racial incitement legislation, he added that ‘the Crown Prosecution Service believes Mr
Grifﬁn would have walked free, even if he had been prosecuted under the new Act’
(Maer 2009, 5).
But why would legislators expend so much time and effort in order to construct legis-
lation that is unworkable and ineffective? I would suggest that such an apparent paradox
symptomatically reveals the separation of religious freedom from free speech, indicating a
prioritization of the latter over the former, even though human rights jurists constantly
warn against a ‘hierarchical approach to rights, which places some over others’ (Malik
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2011, 33). In doing precisely this, however, the framing of the RRHA closely follows twen-
tieth-century First Amendment jurisprudence, which has increasingly sequestered the
right to free expression from other rights, considering it almost in isolation through a
kind of purely formalist categorical analysis. Fish (1994, 125) has pointed out, for instance,
that First Amendment jurisprudence proceeds by ﬁrst asking the question, ‘Is it speech?’ If
it is, then that is that – speech is protected come what may.
In short, the RRHA reframes the relationship between religious liberty and freedom of
expression in terms of a zero-sum game: it assumes that to extend the liberty of one
requires a diminishing of the other. There are two precepts at work here, both related
to a secularism that has accompanied the ascendancy of liberalism in modern societies,
and, indeed, has assumed the status of a foundational epistemology that constitutes
modern governmentality and the disciplinary franchises of social power. The ﬁrst is
that religion is associated with power, and with the state. Liberal conceptualizations of
liberty assume that freedom is only substantiated if it involves freedom from power. Fol-
lowing that line of thought, it is entirely logical to assume that any protection of religion is
a protection of power and this ipso facto is an attenuation of freedom. And it is an attenu-
ation of freedom of expression in particular because, second, religion is conceptualized in
terms of ‘belief’.
The framing deﬁnition of ‘religious hatred’ in the RRHA is ‘hatred against a group of
persons deﬁned by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief’ (2006, 29A). Reli-
gious identity, therefore, is grounded in belief, and this opens up freedom of speech ques-
tions in a way that does not pertain to ‘involuntary’ identities such as ‘race’, because it rests
on the idea that differences in religious identities are due to differences in beliefs that are
voluntarily and therefore rationally and consciously professed rather than socially consti-
tuted and affectively experienced. This in turn means that religious identity is open to
rational ‘debate’ in the ‘marketplace of ideas’ in a way that racial identity is not, and so
the harmful effects of restricting expression with regard to the former is therefore far
more pronounced than it would be for the latter. As David Davis, the Shadow Home Sec-
retary at the time, leading the Opposition to the Bill put it, ‘Religion, unlike race, is a
matter of personal choice and therefore appropriate for open debate’, a view echoed in
most of the opinion pieces and editorials opposing the Bill in the national press (Kelly
2005, 27–28; Meer 2008).
But if religious identity – and therefore religious hatred – is grounded in belief, then it
becomes difﬁcult to disentangle expressions of hatred from legitimate criticism. Unlike
racial abuse and insults, which do not contribute to a debate but simply denigrate and sub-
ordinate their object, abuse and insult on religious grounds must, at least implicitly, offer a
criticism of religious beliefs, since these are the very basis of the identity that is being
attacked. Hence the insistence, as the Bill passed through the Lords, on the removal of
‘abuse and insult’ from the provisions, leaving only ‘threatening’ words that are amply
covered by existing restrictions on speech in any case. Conversely, it also becomes imposs-
ible to criticize religious beliefs without in some way offending against the person who
holds them. Responding to the government claim to be ‘protecting the person and not
the belief’, Lord Hunt asked, ‘Is it possible to draw a distinction between a group of
people who share a religion or ideology and… the religion or ideology itself? If
someone insults my beliefs, I can perfectly well argue that they insult me too’ (Maer
2009, 10).
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This was a central argument in the wider public discourse as well, and key to the anxiety
that the Bill would have a ‘chilling’ effect on ‘legitimate criticism’ of religion, even though it
actually undermines the very distinction between legitimate and illegitimate criticism in
the ﬁrst place. The manner of the speech, its form, is negated as a basis for discriminating
between legitimate and illegitimate criticism because they both potentially have the same
effect – offence – and one cannot therefore really distinguish between reasoned criticism
and abuse/insult because the lattermust contribute to ‘open debate’ as much as the former.
Consequently, ‘intent’ becomes the only means of discriminating between legitimate and
illegitimate forms of expression.
What is occluded, of course, is the possibility that religious identity has, in fact, little or
nothing to do with ‘belief’ for most people but instead involves what Weir (2013, 132–133)
calls ‘inhabiting connections’ or modes of belonging. Such connections might be estab-
lished, for instance, by an intimate and deeply affective connection – identiﬁcation –
with the Prophet Muhammad (Mahmood 2012). The offensive force of an assertion
that the Prophet was a paedophile (a common trope in anti-Muslim discourse) targets
this connection, abusing the person by abusing the object of their affective relation. It is
difﬁcult to see how this involves any criticism of any belief held by any Muslim. And
even if it is held that the insult in fact criticizes the belief that the Prophet is worthy of
veneration, if the basis of that veneration is affective rather than rational, it is difﬁcult
to see how the insult is a contribution to a ‘debate’ as opposed to merely a vehicle for deni-
gration and subordination, thereby aligning it with the ‘wounding’ intent of racial abuse.
Both sides of the main argument advanced in opposition to the Bill – that abuse and
insult are, in fact, forms of criticism of belief, and that it is impossible to criticize beliefs
without insult or causing offence to believers – derive from the voluntarist assumption
that people ‘choose’ their religious identity by subscribing to a set of beliefs. This, of
course, implies that beliefs and the persons who hold them are separable, but it also
leads, as we have seen, to the conclusion that they are also not separable. The grounding
of religious identity in belief therefore constitutes an aporia that reveals the limits of
secular-liberal thought about cultural and religious difference, which rests on the idea
that religious ‘belief’ is a zero-sum game: if my beliefs are true then yours cannot be
(Reddy 2007). Whilst for many religious persons this may indeed be true, it does not
follow that it is structurally fundamental to religious identity as these accounts suggest
it to be, nor does it require that one must therefore ‘incite hatred’ or cause ‘offence’ to
other believers even if one believes their beliefs to be wrong. In ruling out the possibility
that religious identity is not a zero-sum game, that the profession of one’s beliefs does not
necessarily lead to the giving of offence or incitement of hatred against others, this line of
argument forecloses the possibility of religious pluralism and effectively reserves the idea
of pluralism itself as a secular value that is truly enabled and vouchsafed only by the ideol-
ogy of secular-liberalism, because it can only emerge from a lack of belief.
We therefore ﬁnd ourselves confronting a paradox. The RRHA suggests, by its very
existence on the statute book, that religious identities do deserve protection under incite-
ment legislation; on the other hand, the very thing that is to be protected – religious iden-
tity – is deﬁned in such a way as to remove the very protection that the RRHA supposedly
provides. In the RRHA, this amounts to the eclipse of article 18 by article 19, such that the
right to religious freedom with respect to speech acts has been attenuated almost to the
point of nullity. (I say ‘almost’ because certain anomalies remain in which religious
ISLAM AND CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM RELATIONS 15
groups that are also deﬁned as racial groups [Jews and Sikhs, primarily] do receive this
protection.) This is not only because this law subordinates religious freedom to freedom
of expression, but rather because it also implicitly prescribes a particular form of religiosity
– as a matter of private, personal belief – as the only permissible kind. Only this kind of
religiosity is protected because other more public, collectivist, and communal kinds are
simply not recognized. This is not to say that freedom of religion no longer exists in
Britain, but it does suggest that such freedom is only properly protected within certain par-
ameters beyond which religious liberty is vulnerable to restriction, as evidenced, for
example, in the various burqa bans enacted throughout Europe. Indeed, France’s use of
laïcité as an explicit justiﬁcation for such restrictions on religious liberty dramatically illus-
trates the point, because the same secular-liberal assumptions are at work as in the debate
surrounding the RRHA, only in this case they are more pronounced and visible. Britain’s
legal traditions and popular understandings of liberty have so far resisted the lure of such
restrictions even though, within the problematic of multicultural ‘crisis’, such restrictions
on religious dress, diet, ritual and education are regularly called for.
III
In her recent examination of the rise of religious intolerance in Europe and the USA, Nuss-
baum (2013, 94) argues that this intolerance is more marked in contemporary Europe
because ‘European nations tend to conceive of nationhood and national belonging in
ethno-religious and cultural-linguistic terms. Thus new immigrant groups, and religious
minorities, have difﬁculty being seen as full and equal members of the nation’. This, in
turn, determines these nations’ conception of religious liberty, since this underlying
idea of nationhood has, as its corollary, an established church (and arguably French
laïcité is itself a form of establishment). ‘When a nation has an established church’,
writes, Nussbaum (2013, 92),
it may easily create a regime of unequal liberty. Even if it does not aggressively limit liberty for
minorities, it may well make minorities jump through hoops that the majority does not have
to jump through… That’s quintessential modern Establishmentarianism: power and
tolerance.
European nations, she suggests, struggle to conceive of religious liberty in terms that go
beyond mere tolerance. The effects of this kind of tolerance, in which ‘others get their
rights at the sufferance of the majority’, are plain to see in the contours of the multicultural
‘crisis’ animating contemporary Europe. Noting the rise not only in intolerance but also in
accompanying discriminatory laws, she draws attention to situations where religious dis-
crimination becomes embedded in social practice, even when there are no legislative
restrictions on the rights of Muslims, in particular, to practise and express their religion.
In Finland, for example, ‘discrimination in employment against women who wear the
Muslim headscarf is a common complaint… [s]ome employers (the police and certain
food stores) say openly that they will not employ a woman wearing a headscarf’ (5).
The constriction of religious liberty here extends to the denial of other fundamental
rights, notably article 14 of the ECHR and article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, which prohibit discrimination and yet which are openly
transgressed. More generally, and broadly, if permissible religiosity is deﬁned in
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secular-liberal terms as ‘private belief’, then any manifestation of a religiosity that traverses
the sanctioned dichotomy between public and private identities is positioned as operating
on the boundaries of the tolerable and thus permitted only at the sufferance of not only the
majority religion, but also of the secular-liberal juridico-political arrangements with which
established religions in Western Europe have, over the course of the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, come to a rapprochement. As Malik (2011, 26) puts it, ‘although liberal
democracies guarantee freedom of religion and belief, they seem to do so from a position
of superiority where the framework and terms of debate are unilaterally dictated by secular
liberalism’. Malik points out that this holds true for elements of the majority religion that
move beyond the secular-liberal paradigm (e.g. evangelical or fundamentalist Christianity)
as well as for minority religions, but it is also the case that in practice there are hierarchies
of tolerability that roughly map on to the hierarchies of belonging mobilized as part of the
ensemble of neo-liberal racisms that constitute integrationist politics in Europe today
(Lentin and Titley 2011). Thus, while the headscarf may not be worn by public employees
– including teachers – in parts of Germany, Holland, Spain and Belgium, ‘nuns are per-
mitted to teach in full habit’ (Nussbaum 2013, 4). This, in turn, also restricts the
freedom of speech of religious minorities in practice, if not in theory, because, if such
groups are systematically subordinated and marginalized, their moral worth is devalued,
and consequently their contributions to the public debate (of protest, or explanation, for
example) will be discounted and discredited by virtue of the fact that their views, if given
room for articulation in the ﬁrst place, will not be taken as seriously as the views of those
who occupy the centre of public discourse (Mondal 2014, 42).
Wendy Brown has ampliﬁed these points in her analysis of the discourse of tolerance as
a technique of modern liberal governmentality, and has brought it to bear on contempor-
ary US politics and society as well, much more acutely and critically than Nussbaum.
Noting that ‘the cultural-political ﬁeld of tolerance as a civic practice is largely inside
the domain demarcated as legal’, she argues that ‘tolerance discourse…while posing as
both a universal value and an impartial practice, designates certain beliefs and practices
as civilized and others as barbaric, both at home and abroad’ (Brown 2006, 12) and ‘it
operates from a conceit of neutrality that is actually thick with bourgeois Protestant
norms’ (7). This is not so very different from the European establishmentarianism ident-
iﬁed by Nussbaum, and Brown goes on to argue that the function of tolerance is to depo-
liticize ‘inequality, subordination, marginalization, and social conﬂict, which all require
political analysis and political solutions’, by rendering them as ‘personal’ challenges to
be overcome by individuals, on the one hand, or construing them as the ‘natural’
outcome of religious and cultural difference on the other. Seen from this perspective,
‘all objects of tolerance are marked as deviant, marginal, or undesirable by virtue of
being tolerated, and the action of tolerance inevitably affords some access to superiority’
(14).
Brown’s intervention is salutary, and I shall return to some of the implications of con-
temporary ‘tolerance discourse’ in due course; nevertheless, Nussbaum’s contention that
the USA has historically developed political arrangements and legal instruments to go
beyond mere toleration is one that concurs with the argument presented in the ﬁrst
section of this essay, and, indeed, the emergence of tolerance as a technique of liberal gov-
ernmentality in the current conjuncture further corroborates my central contention that
the balance between the various liberties encoded in the First Amendment has been
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upset, at least in the civic-political ﬁeld. In large measure, the wording and structure of the
First Amendment reﬂects the inﬂuence of a more radical thinker on religious liberty than
Locke on ﬁgures such as Madison andWashington, in particular, and pre- and post-Revo-
lutionary American society more generally. If Washington, in his famous Letter to the
Newport Hebrew Congregation (1790), was able to write,
All possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship. It is now no more that
toleration is spoken of, as it was, by the indulgence of one class of people that another enjoyed
the exercise of their natural rights, (quoted in Nussbaum 2013, 69)
it was because the ‘accommodationist’ view of religious freedom ﬁrst put forward by the
seventeenth-century theologian, philosopher, religious dissident and founder of Rhode
Island, Roger Williams, had gained enough traction to become absorbed into the Bill of
Rights.
Although, as Bailyn (1992) suggests, Locke was by far the more decisive inﬂuence on
mainstream political thought in the 1760s–1770s, Williams’ ideas can be seen at work
in the beliefs and practices of the religious non-conformists who, as I have argued
above, did so much to impress upon Madison and others the need for as expansive a
concept of religious liberty as possible, one that constitutionally guaranteed the right
not only to freedom of conscience, but also to put into practice what conscience
demands. For Locke, toleration demands that everyone (subject to certain exceptions) is
entitled to hold their own beliefs and opinions without persecution or molestation, as
long as these do not conﬂict with the needs or interests of the state, but when there is a
conﬂict, the interests of the state take priority; the state cannot compel someone to
believe or even act contrary to the dictates of their conscience, but it is entitled to
impose a penalty upon them, this being the price of toleration. Williams, on the other
hand, suggests that since ‘laws in a democracy are always made by majorities’, they
will naturally embody majority ideas of convenience, in matters ranging from choice of work-
days to the legal status of various drugs. Even if such laws are not persecutory in intent, they
may turn out to be very unfair to minorities. (as summarized in Nussbaum 2013, 73)
In certain circumstances, argued Williams, only a special exemption from such laws – an
‘accommodation’ – would truly vouchsafe religious liberty, because that liberty can be vio-
lated not only by compelling someone to afﬁrm beliefs or convictions they may not hold
(which Williams called ‘soul rape’), but also by preventing the outward conduct that their
beliefs require (65). Without such exemptions ‘the majority [would be] claiming for itself a
liberty much more extensive than it was prepared to grant to others’ (75), and this is why
Nussbaum concludes that the accommodationist position ‘reaches subtle forms of dis-
crimination that are ubiquitous in majoritarian democratic life’, that Lockean arguments
for toleration do not (87). By contrast, tolerance as a technique of liberal governmentality
produces precisely such forms of subtle discrimination through the depoliticization of
social exclusion and political marginalization.
Williams contests the belief–conduct distinction that is the foundation of Lockean tol-
eration, and which continues to inform contemporary jurisprudence (Leigh 2011; Malik
2011, 24). And yet, despite the increasing reticence of the US Supreme Court to apply
accommodations in relation to ‘free exercise’ cases that come before it (McConnell
1990), Williams’ ideas continue to speak to and inform jurists’ deliberations concerning
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the nature and scope of religious liberty, especially when accommodations are felt to be the
only way to resolve tricky cases involving conﬂicting rights. Malik (2011, 24), for instance,
cites Lord Nicholls’ argument that article 9 of the ECHR ‘is not conﬁned to freedom to
hold a religious belief. It includes the right to express and practice one’s beliefs.
Without this, freedom of religion would be emasculated’. Moreover, as Malik (2011, 25)
goes on to note,
the distinction between a wide range of latitude for belief, but a more restrictive approach to
action, depends on some consensus about the social values that underwrite religion. In
increasingly plural societies it will be difﬁcult to apply the doctrine because it provides no
substantive guide to what types of manifestation of belief falls within the permissible range.
Unlike Locke, who was not able or willing to extend toleration to atheists and non-
Christians, Williams was able to do so (to ‘the most paganish, Jewish, Turkish, or
antichristian consciences and worships’) precisely because the mechanism of the accom-
modation, which rests on the dismantling of the belief–conduct distinction, expands the
concept of freedom of conscience itself and tries to account for it; moreover, the inclusion
of ‘conduct’ encompasses a collective and social dimension to religious liberty such that it is
not reducible or equivalent to the beliefs and opinions of an individual believer. If part of
the multicultural ‘crisis’ is based on the presence of religious minorities (especially
Muslims) whose demands for religious liberty exceed the secular-liberal parameters of
individual conscience and blur the public–private and belief–conduct distinctions, then
it would seem that religious accommodationism of the kind advocated by Williams
seems particularly appropriate in the current conjuncture. And this, in turn, affects the
conceptualization of free speech, because it directly bears upon the freedom of expression
of religious communities. Unlike the secular-liberal conception of free speech in which
expression is merely the externalization of an individual interiority (conscience, belief
and opinion) severed from social practices and collective frameworks of meaning, accom-
modationism attempts to move freedom of expression beyond Milton’s (1644 [2012], 566)
argument that society as a whole beneﬁts because ‘out of many moderate varieties and
brotherly dissimilitudes that are not vastly disproportional’ truth will necessarily
emerge. This concept of toleration and free speech rests on a scale of differences that
are ‘not vastly disproportional’, that is, on a consensus that Malik has noted is no
longer available. As Peters (2005) has shown, this strand of Milton’s argument in Areopa-
gitica persists in modern liberal free speech theory, which is perhaps why it struggles to
make sense of its encounter with non-liberal arguments for free speech, often assuming
them to be arguments against free speech per se rather than different kinds of argument
for it based on alternative premises (Mondal 2014). But there is also a deeper point to be
made: accommodationism, insofar as it extends the scope of religious liberty, also extends
the nature and scope of free expression, thereby demonstrating once more the indissoluble
link between the two freedoms. The extension is qualitative rather than quantitative: it
does not so much mean that ‘more’ speech will be protected (although it might), but
rather that freedom of expression can be re-conceptualized in such a way as to move
liberal free speech theory beyond its existing parameters by offering a different conception
of expression itself, one that is not merely discursive but also a form of action; not simply
individual and singular, but also social and relational. This would continue to acknowledge
the ‘right’ of the individual to freedom of expression as a fundamental one, but also situate
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such expression in a wider social context where expression can be seen as a pharmakon
that can be both the cause of social conﬂicts and the means through which they are
addressed and, perhaps, overcome. Conceiving expression as a social pharmakon –
which is both poison and cure – shifts the emphasis beyond the legalistic framework of
‘rights’ into the space that is ‘off the radar screen of the formally political’ because it is
‘remaindered’ by liberalism’s conﬂation of the legal and the political (Brown 2006, 12).
In this ‘cultural-political’ space one can – indeed must – situate freedom of speech not
just as a legal right but as a form of ethical praxis in which the task is to build fragile soli-
darities and assemblages of consensus out of apparently incommensurable religious and
cultural pluralities.
Accommodationism is not without its problems, however. One is practical: it rests on
carving out individual exemptions from wider, generally valid laws such that there is an ad
hoc element inherent to any juridical praxis that attempts to administer it, and arguably
this means that judges are required to create laws rather than interpret them, which pre-
sents itself as a democratic – and therefore political – problem, too. Second, as Maleiha
Malik has pointed out, contemporary freedom of religion is often in conﬂict with equality
and anti-discrimination legislation, especially when the conﬂict revolves around reli-
giously motivated/mandated objections to sexual orientation. ‘Although exemptions are
the preferred approach in current legislation’, writes Malik (2011, 30), ‘they are not the
ideal mechanism for addressing the religion v sexuality conﬂict’, because ‘the mechanism
of granting exemptions delegates the power of deﬁnition to religious organisations, who in
turn frequently represent the most conservative viewpoints’. Nussbaum (2013, 79),
however, does provide a response to this difﬁculty from within the accommodationist
tradition:
For the accommodationist… the relevant unit theoretically is the conscience of the individ-
ual. Thus, if someone has a nonstandard interpretation of his or her religion, it cuts no ice to
say that the majority of that religion’s members do not agree.
Thus, an individual’s interpretation, when weighed against the ‘typically’ conservative
views of religious organizations, should count for no less in the jurist’s deliberations; on
the other hand, neither can the views of ‘conservatives’ be discounted either, on the
same principle, and, practically speaking, it is likely to be those views that typically
come into conﬂict with sexual equality legislation. A third problem is that accommoda-
tionism seems to favour religious claims of conscience over and above analogous non-reli-
gious or secular claims. This, as I have argued above, is anticipated and encoded in the
First Amendment such that freedom of expression can act as a ballast that balances the
liberties of the non-religious, especially if ‘expression’ is conceived of in more capacious
ways, and there are other ways of addressing this problem too by, for example, expanding
the concept of ‘conscience’ or limiting it to ‘religion’ in relation to certain things (e.g.
drugs), whilst expanding it for others (such as conscription) (Nussbaum 2013, 88–89).
Despite these problems, there are four major advantages to accommodationism. The
ﬁrst is that in contrast to the depoliticizing procedural formalism of liberal legalism,
accommodationism proceeds from the acknowledgment of a political fact: in democracies,
laws are made by majorities and are, therefore, never neutral but always implicitly major-
itarian. It therefore recognizes that unequal power relations underwrite the formation of
the law itself and seeks a mechanism to compensate for that fact and thereby protect
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minorities from being implicitly positioned in an unequal position before the law. Unlike
liberal or Lockean conceptions of liberty, it does not proceed from the abstract principle of
formal equality before the law as if that were itself sufﬁcient to guarantee actual equality. It
is thus particularly appropriate for contemporary multicultures in which religious and
other minorities are disadvantaged before the law precisely because they are disadvantaged
in the civic-political ﬁeld. The second advantage is rhetorical. It requires a conceptual fra-
mework, and therefore discourse, that is at odds with the rhetorical assemblages of politi-
cal discourses mobilizing neo-liberal integrationist policies in Euro-America and
Australasia. In contrast to the discourse of ‘tolerance’ that is such a key part of such inte-
grationist rhetoric, with its idiom of ‘sufferance’ that implicitly positions minorities as
unequal and ‘outside’, accommodationism offers idioms of welcome and hospitality,
and emphasizes a shared ‘dwelling’ that obligates both majorities and minorities to
observe relations of reciprocity and mutuality, whilst recognizing, of course, that such
obligations cannot be reduced to neutrality through legal proceduralism. Third, insofar
as accommodationist politics must, in order to be effective, be institutionalized in juridical
praxis, it uses the law both as an instrument of political accommodation that redresses the
imbalance of power for minorities and as an ethical signal: a law that accommodates
difference is one that signals to different peoples that they are truly welcome to participate
in society, because their difference is given respect and they are accorded ‘equal and ample’
liberty to practise that difference, within wide parameters. In its own, limited way, the
RRHA offers just such an ethical signal. At the same time, the ethical signal of the law
need not be unidirectional. It can be used to ‘expand the moral imagination’ by
nudging majorities into considering or imagining social and political life from the perspec-
tive of minorities, something that majoritarian democracy often obstructs (Nussbaum
2013, 114).
Finally, accommodationism is particularly pertinent in addressing the subtle forms of
discrimination suffered by religious communities that do not observe the secularist – as
opposed to secular – assumptions that underpin regimes of permissible religiosity. The
most notable of these is the distinction between private passion and conviction, on the
one hand, and public rectitude on the other, as well as the belief–conduct distinction.
From the beginning, accommodationism was always about acknowledging the role of reli-
gious motivation and conduct in the public sphere, and not just a matter of individual con-
science and belief. Roger Williams, for instance, compared the prevention of outward
religious conduct to a ‘prison’ for the conscience, but he also argued that it could be vio-
lated ‘within’ as a form of ‘soul rape’. While a discursive regime of permissible religiosity
that determines social and institutional parameters of ‘correct’ religious behaviour based
on secularist assumptions – at its most extreme restricting it to the extent that it must
become publicly invisible – can clearly be aligned with the ﬁrst of Williams’ concerns,
can it also have effects akin to the latter, to ‘soul rape’? It is at least arguable that such
a regime, in which public observance of religion beyond the merely ritual and sacerdotal
(such as the insistence that to be properly religious one must bring one’s faith-based per-
spective to bear on matters of public ethical and political concern) is deemed impermis-
sible, involves a degree of vulnerability that violates conscience to quite a large extent. If
that is the case, the public–private distinction needs to be challenged and erased; those reli-
gious communities that occupy or seek to occupy the public space should be allowed to do
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so, albeit under the terms of a secular constitution that guarantees a religiously neutral
state that has no room for blasphemy laws or an established church.
This, to a very great extent, is precisely the arrangement established by the US Consti-
tution. And yet, as I have argued, the imbalance in the relation between freedom of religion
and freedom of expression in public and political discourse is as apparent in the USA as
elsewhere in Euro-America and Australasia. And although, to some extent, jurists’ pro-
fessional knowledge of case law precedents and their deeper insights into the principles
underlying them has meant that such trends in social commentary have not been repli-
cated precisely in jurisprudence, the latter is nevertheless not fully insulated or separable
from the former. Jurists are also members of society and are not removed from or immune
to the wider currents of opinion in relation to which they go about their work. That being
the case, the priority of freedom of expression over freedom of religion, which is the
outcome of a long process of secularization, has to some extent both been replicated in
jurisprudence and to an even greater extent impacted upon the legislatures. Through
the course of the twentieth century, First Amendment jurisprudence has, for example,
incrementally strengthened protections for freedom of expression and weakened religious
liberty by becoming increasingly unwilling to allow exemptions and accommodations to
secular law (McConnell 1990). The task of rebalancing these liberties thus falls principally
not in the juridical realm but in the civic-political sphere, in the space of cultural politics.
This is precisely why controversies over the limits of freedom of speech have been
especially mobilized by religious communities, because, as I have argued elsewhere
(Mondal 2014), the politics of controversy about religiously ‘offensive’ speech is a signiﬁer
of a political effort by some groups, notably Muslims, to challenge what they see as a debil-
itating imbalance between religious freedom and freedom of speech in contemporary
Western multicultures. The protagonists of such controversies may not be aware of the
deeper tasks that lie beneath the epiphenomena of their political mobilizations, but
such events do offer an opportunity to see the underlying problematic more clearly. Con-
temporary Muslim dissatisfaction with present arrangements catalytically reveals the sheer
scale of the task ahead if freedom of religion and freedom of speech are to be rebalanced in
the way that the First Amendment so perspicaciously suggests they should be, one invol-
ving nothing less than the fundamental re-evaluation of what liberty is for, and its relation-
ship to (in)equality and social solidarity: should we value liberty above all else, or, in a
multicultural, multireligious society, should we rethink liberty so as to achieve, rather
than thwart, equality and social solidarity?
Notes
1. In letter no. 15, ‘Cato’ (i.e. John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon) write, ‘Without Freedom of
Thought, there can be no such thing as Wisdom; and no such thing as Publick Liberty,
without Freedom of Speech’. Later in the essay, they write another of the recited truths
within free speech discourse: ‘Freedom of speech is the Bulwark of Liberty; they prosper and
die together’ (cited in Bogen 1983, 447–448). There is, nevertheless, a slight difference
between the two formulations. In the ﬁrst, free speech is the source and foundation of all
‘publick Liberty’; in the second, it is not – a bulwark is not a foundation but an obstruction
against slippage back to some prior state.
2. No pagination. I have consulted the open access version posted by Smith at: http://www.uark.
edu/depts/comminfo/cambridge/origins (accessed 25 September 2015).
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3. Note that this does not invalidate the communal protections afforded to religious ‘communities
of belief’ by the free exercise clause, and the question of whether secular ‘communities of belief’
should be protected under this clause is moot, perhaps because they can, on the one hand,
receive protection as individuals using the free speech clause, and, conversely, would not
want to seek protection as a community for fear of undermining their ‘secular’ character. In
any case, the protection of secular communities can be aligned with protections afforded to eth-
nicities, races, genders and sexualities.
4. Apart from the ﬁrst, which is not a right but a constitutional settlement of the relationship of the
state to religion (disestablishment) known as the ‘establishment clause’, the rights enumerated
are freedom of religion (article 18 in the United Declaration of Human Rights); freedom of
speech and the press (article 19); freedom of assembly and association (article 20); and the
right to take part in the government of one’s country (article 21).
5. ‘What once appeared to be a jurisprudence highly sympathetic to religious claims now appears
virtually closed to them’, writes McConnell (1990, 1417). This is because ‘[s]ince 1972, the
[Supreme] Court has rejected every claim for a free exercise exemption to come before it’.
This rejection of accommodationism in favour of Lockean toleration has considerable impli-
cations for the scope of religious liberty and is symptomatic of a hegemonic secularism that
deﬁnes permissible religiosity in strictly privatized, individual terms. As I argue in the ﬁnal
section of this essay, this attenuates religious liberty for religious minorities and those that do
not observe the private–public distinction.
6. The next section draws heavily on the ﬁnal chapter of my book Islam and Controversy (Mondal
2014).
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